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INTRODUCTION

of
tension in the investigation
long-standing
A
IS
HERE safety events (FSEs) between (1),the goals of aviation
flight
safety to rapidly identify causes, record lessons to be learned,
and prevent recurrences; and (2) the need for individual accountability in any state which observes the rule of law.' The
implication of this tension is that the aircrew will not cooperate
with FSE investigations, or use equipment such as cockpit voice

T

* LL.M (Cantab), MA (Hons) (Massey), LL.B (Well). Christopher Griggs is a
barrister practicing from the Wellington chambers of Barristers.comm in New
Zealand. Prior to joining the independent bar he was a legal officer in the Royal
New Zealand Navy and Chief Legal Advisor to the Commander Joint Forces New
Zealand. This article was presented at the 33rd Annual Conference of the
Aviation Law Association of Australia and New Zealand in Melbourne on May 8,
2014. The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments on earlier drafts
provided by Patrick Hornby at ATSB, Jonathan Aleck at CASA, and Peter
Williams at TAIC. Any errors in this paper are the responsibility of the author
alone.
I The Honorable P. de Jersey, Chief Justice of Queensland, The Disclosure in
Evidence of Black Box Recordings, David Boughen Memorial Address before the
(Oct. 18,
Aviation Law Association of Australia and New Zealand Conference
81
099.htm.
1999), available at http://archive.sclqld.org.au/judgepub/dj1
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recorders, if there is a risk that their evidence will then be used
against them in a criminal prosecution or civil proceeding. 2
There seems to be little doubt that a lack of candor by aircrew
following an FSE poses a real risk to aviation safety. 3 A critical
aspect of an FSE is the ability of investigators to rapidly identify
whether the incident or accident was caused by pilot error, an
equipment malfunction, an external cause, or some combination of these or other factors. If equipment malfunction cannot
be ruled out quickly by an admission of pilot error, the potential
also exists for significant commercial consequences for the aviation industry due to the need to ground that aircraft type as a
safety precaution.
In response to this tension, the concept of 'Just Culture" has
evolved. It is a concept that carries a great deal of weight in the
aviation community. There are various definitions of the concept, but the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) defines it as "a culture in which
front line operators and others are not punished for actions,
omissions, or decisions taken by them that are commensurate
with their experience and training, but where gross negligence,
wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated." This
definition was approved in a regulation adopted by the Council
of Europe on April 3, 2014,' and has attracted wide acceptance
internationally.
While the concept of Just Culture would seem unobjectionable to many at first glance, the difficulty of implementing it lies
in defining its scope and reconciling it with competing precepts
of both international and domestic law and philosophy. It is perhaps for these reasons that Australia expressed reservations
about the concept in a recent working paper presented to the

2 See SIDNEY DEKKER, JUST CULTURE: BALANCING SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
17
(2007).
Lindsay Fenwick & Michael Huhn, CriminalLiability and Aircraft Accident Investigation, AIR LINE PILOT, May 2003, at 17, available at http://www.alpa.org/por
tals/alpa/magazine/2003/May2003_CriminalLiability.htm.
4 Just Culture: Findingthe Right Balance Between the Aviation, Judicial and Political
Authorities, EUROCONTROL (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.eurocontrol.int/arti
cles/just-culture [hereinafter just Culture: Finding the Right Balance].
5 Regulation 376-2014, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 3
April 2014 on the Reporting, Analysis and Follow-up of Occurrences in Civil Avia-

tion, 2014 OJ. (L 122) 18, 25.
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International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Technical
Commission.'
This article looks at the extent to which the notion of Just
Culture is or might be accommodated within the frameworks of
law that apply to both civil and military aviation in Australia and
New Zealand. It examines what, if any, international obligations
these countries might have in relation to the implementation of
Just Culture and measures their respective domestic laws against
the applicable international standards. The article concludes
that Just Culture is only partially implemented in Australia and
New Zealand and to varying degrees. Finally, this article examines the case for full implementation within a philosophical
context.
II. JUST CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL
AVIATION LAW
The principal treaty governing aviation safety under international law is the Chicago Convention.' However, given the scope
of this article, it should be recognized that while the Chicago
Convention applies to civil aircraft, it does not apply to state aircraft, i.e., "aircraft used in military, customs and police
services."'
Article 37 of the Chicago Convention authorizes ICAO to:
"adopt and amend from time to time, as may be necessary, international standards and recommended practices and procedures
6 Some Caveats on 'Just Culture" (Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Working Paper No.
A37-WP/289, 2010), available at http://www.icao.int/Meetings/AMC/Assembly
37/Working%2OPapers%20by%20Number/wp289_en.pdf.
7 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295, [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. The Chicago Convention entered into force for Australia on April 4, 1947, and for New Zealand on April 6,
1947. Convention on InternationalCivil Aviation Signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944,
INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of% 20
Parties/ChicagoEN.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2014).
8 Chicago Convention, supra note 7, art. 3. Milde argues that Article 3(b) does
not exhaustively define the scope of "state aircraft" for the purposes of the Chicago Convention. MICHAEL MILDE, INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW AND ICAO 70 (2008).
However, EUROCONTROL and most other commentators are of the view that it
does. See Definition of State Aircraft, EUROCONTROL, https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/content/documents/single-sky/cm/ibrary/cmacdefinition-of-state-aircraft-200107.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2014); THE LAw OF AIR
WARFARE: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 139 (Natalino Ronzitti & Gabriella Venturini
eds., 2006); Michel Bourbonniere & Louis Haeck, Military Aircraft and International Law: Chicago Opus 3, 66 AIR L. & COM. 885, 900 (2001).

J.
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. investigation of accidents."' Article 26 of the

Chicago Convention provides that contracting states must investigate FSEs with respect to foreign-registered aircraft in their national airspace in accordance with the ICAO procedures if the
FSE involves death or serious injury, or indicates a serious technical defect in the aircraft or air navigation facilities, "so far as
[their] laws permit.""
The ICAO Council first adopted Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for Aircraft Accident Inquiries on
April 11, 1951, designating that instrument as Annex 13 to the
Chicago Convention (Annex 13)." Annex 13 is now in its tenth
edition.12 It contains a number of important benchmarks supporting the limited application of Just Culture in respect of FSE
investigations. First, Standard 3.1 provides that: "The sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident shall be the
prevention of accidents and incidents. It is not the purpose of
this activity to apportion blame or liability."" Second, Chapter 5
provides that the FSE investigation must be kept separate from
"any judicial or administrative proceedings to apportion blame
or liability."" It recognizes the need for coordination between
accident investigators and criminal investigators,' but states
that certain evidence should not ordinarily be shared with the
latter by an accident investigator, namely:
* statements taken during the FSE investigation;
* "communications between persons ... involved in the operation of the aircraft";
* "medical or private information regarding persons involved
in the [FSE]";
* cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recordings and transcripts;
* air traffic control unit recordings and transcripts;
* "cockpit airborne image recordings and . . . transcripts";
and
Chicago Convention, supra note 7, art. 37.
10 Id. art. 26.

11 INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., ANNEX 13 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION: AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATION, at ix, X

(10th ed. 2010) [hereinafter ANNEX 13].
12 Id. at i.
13 ANNEX 13, supra note 11, at para. 3.1.
14 Id. at para. 5.4.1.
15 Id. at para. 5.10.
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* "opinions expressed in the analysis of information, including flight recorder information. "16
The only exception to this restriction permitted by Annex 13 is
where "the appropriate authority for the administration of justice in that [s]tate determines that [the necessity of disclosing
such information] outweighs the adverse domestic and international impact such action may have on that or any future
investigations."1 7
While the SARPs are not themselves binding treaty obligations," any contracting state that does not adopt domestic legislation consistent with a standard must report the inconsistency
to ICAO. 1 9 The Chicago Convention essentially authorizes ICAO
to "name and shame" any such state-ordinarily a powerful disincentive in the diplomatic sphere. However, in its 2013 Safety
Report, ICAO reported that global implementation of SARPs relating to accident investigation still stands at only 51%.20
Data like this has led some commentators to make uncomplimentary remarks about the gulf between ICAO standards and
actual implementation.2 1 Indeed, the continuing use of evidence collected by FSE investigations for domestic prosecutions
led the 35th Session of the ICAO Assembly in 2004 to adopt
resolution A35-17, in which the Assembly:
Concerned by a trend for safety information to be used for disciplinary and enforcement actions and to be admitted as evidence in
judicial proceedings; ...
Mindful that the use of safety information for other than safetyrelated purposes may inhibit the provision of such information,
with an adverse effect on aviation safety;
Consideringthat a balance needs to be struck between the need
for the protection of safety information and the need for the
proper administration of justice; ...
1. Instructs the Council to develop appropriate legal guidance ...

2. Urges all Contracting States to examine their existing legislation and adjust as necessary, or enact laws and regula16

17

Id. at para. 5.12.

Id.

18 N.Z. Air Line Pilots' Ass'n Inc. v Attorney-Gen. [ 1997] 3 NZLR 269 (CA) 280.
19 Chicago Convention, supra note 7, art. 38.
20 2013 Safety Report, INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG. (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.

icao.int/safety/Documents/ICAO_2013-Safety-ReportFINAL.pdf.
21 MILDRED TROGELER, CRIMINALISATION OF AIR ACCIDENTS AND THE CREATION

4-6 (2014), available at http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/
mildred-tr-366geler-eala-prize.doc).pdf.
OF A JUST CULTURE
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tions to protect information gathered from all relevant
safety data collection and processing systems based, to the
extent possible, on the legal guidance developed by
ICAO .

22

The legal guidance referred to in resolution A35-17 is now
found at Attachment E to Annex 13.23 At its thirty-eighth session
late last year, the ICAO Assembly directed the Council to take
steps to strengthen that guidance and related parts of Annexes
13 and 19.24 As it stands, Attachment E establishes a body of
principles governing the use of aviation safety information
where that information was collected "for explicit safety purposes and the disclosure of the information would inhibit its
continued availability." 2 5 Those principles largely replicate the
relevant parts of Chapter 5 of Annex 13 referred to above but
also recognize that a contracting state's domestic law may properly permit the disclosure of aviation safety information for a
prosecution where the evidence or circumstances indicate that
the relevant conduct was committed2 1 "with intent to cause damage, or conduct with knowledge that damage would probably
result, equivalent to reckless conduct, gross negligence or wilful
misconduct....27
The legal guidance goes even further with respect to cockpit
voice recorders (CVRs):
Considering that ambient workplace recordings required by legislation, such as cockpit voice recorders (CVRs), may be perceived as constituting an invasion of privacy for operational
personnel that other professions are not exposed to, . . . subject

to the principles of protection and exception above, national
laws and regulations should consider ambient workplace recordings required by legislation as privileged protected information,
i.e. information deserving enhanced protection. .. 28
22 INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE ASSEMBLY 17
(2004), available at http://www.icao.int/Meetings/AMC/MA/Assembly%2035th
%20Session/a35_resproven.pdf.
23 INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., ANNEX 13 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION, ATTACHMENT E, LEGAL GUIDANCE FOR THE PROTECTION OF
INFORMATION FROM SAFETY DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESSING SYSTEMS (2010)
[hereinafter ATTACHMENT E].
24 Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Assembly Resolution in Force (as of 4 October
2013), at I-103-04, 11-28 ICAO Doc. 1 0022 (2014).
25 ATTACHMENT E, supra note 23, para. 3.1.
26

Id. at para. 4.

27

Id.
Id. at para. 7.

28
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It follows that, in broad terms, ICAO SARPs require contracting states to keep the evidence with respect to an FSE investigation separate from whatever evidence might be collected to
support a prosecution. The only exception to this is in cases of
reckless conduct, gross negligence, or willful misconduct.29 Even
in those cases, the ICAO legal guidance suggests that CVR recordings should not be admissible under domestic law.so
In many cases, if the restrictions on evidence-sharing required
by Annex 13 are observed by a contracting state, they are likely
to inhibit the successful prosecution of alleged offenses in the
less serious category. This is consistent with Just Culture. However, what the SARPs fail to do explicitly is discourage national
law enforcement agencies from collecting their own evidence to
support a prosecution within that category.3 ' A fully fledged Just
Culture would align the relevant state's prosecution policy with
the evidence-sharing exception in Annex 13 so that the state's
authorities would only prosecute if the alleged conduct was sufficiently serious to warrant the admissibility of material from the
safety investigation.3 2
Furthermore, as mentioned above, there is a significant-and
worrisome-gap between the provisions of Annexes 13 and 19
on the one hand and the actual implementation of those provisions in the domestic law of contracting states on the other. The
difficulty lies in the fact that the SARPs are effectively "soft
law"-i.e., "norms of various degrees of cogency, persuasiveness,
and consensus which are incorporated in agreements between
[s]tates but do not create enforceable rights and duties." 3
Much effort has been devoted within ICAO towards improving the wording of the SARPs. That is laudable. However, what is
needed to make a real difference to international compliance
with those SARPs is a paradigm shift. The key standards encapsulated in the SARPs should be given binding effect at internaId. at para. 4.
Id. at para. 7.
31 See, e.g., Annex 19, which states at Attachment A that contracting states
should establish "the conditions and circumstances under which to deal with
safety deviations through established enforcement procedures," without providing any guidance in that respect. INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., ANNEX 19 TO THE
29

30

CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION: SAFETY MANAGEMENT, ATTACHMENT A, FRAMEWORK FOR A STATE SAFETY PROGRAM § 1.4 (1st ed. 2013).
32 Tony Licu et al., Everything You Always Wanted to Know AboutJust Culture (But
Were Afraid to Ask), 18 HINDSIGHT 14 (2013).
33 Richard R. Baxter, International Law in "Her Infinite Variety", 29 INT'L &

COMP. L.Q. 549 (1980).
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tional law under an amendment, or perhaps a new protocol, to
the Chicago Convention. Even more importantly, aircraft
should not be permitted to undertake international air navigation unless the state of registry complies with those standards.
States hosting key international hub airports, like China, Japan,
the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, could have an important role in that respect. However, in
the current diplomatic climate, adoption of binding international rules may be an unrealistic target, noting that comparable
provisions regulating the investigation of marine casualties
under the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS)," which came into force on January 1, 2010, were
crafted in a largely non-binding format with respect to the matters covered by Annexes 13 and 19.36 Despite this, the goal of
uniformity in the implementation of aviation safety standards,
based on binding rules of international law, is one to which the
international aviation community should aspire. In an age of increasing interconnectedness and air travel across the globe by
citizens of all nations using diverse carriers, a failure to pursue
this goal imperils the fundamental duty of every contracting
state towards its own citizens.
The next part of this article examines the extent to which Just
Culture and specifically the SARPs discussed above have been
incorporated into domestic law in Australia and New Zealand.
III. JUST CULTURE UNDER AUSTRALIAN LAW
The Commonwealth Parliament has power under the Australian Constitution to legislate for aviation safety throughout Australia and, in the case of Australian-registered aircraft, outside
Australia.3 6 This power has been exercised with respect to the
investigation of FSEs through the enactment of the Civil Aviation Act of 1988 and the Transport Safety Investigation Act of
2003 (TSI Act).
3 Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 277; Efthimios E. Mitropoulas,
Sec'y Gen., Int'l Mar. Org., Speech at the Marine Accident Investigators' International Forum (Sept. 29, 2008).
3
See Int'l Maritime Org. [IMO], Adoption ofAmendments to the InternationalConvention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as Amended, IMO Safety Comm. Res.
MSC.257(84), annex 3, reg 6 (May 16, 2008).
36 Airlines of NSW Pty. Ltd. v New South Wales (No. 2) (1965) 113 C.L.R. 54
(H.C.A.). Laws made by the Commonwealth, as the federal government of Australia, are designated (Cth.) to distinguish them from laws made by Australian
state and territory governments.
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These two Commonwealth Acts establish two separate agencies with authority to conduct parallel investigations following
an FSE. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) is Australia's transport accident investigator, fulfilling the role described in Annex 13. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority
(CASA) is, inter alia, the Commonwealth's aviation enforcement
authority.38 The two agencies may investigate any FSE involving
a civil aircraft" in Australia or registered in Australia.4 0 The
ATSB may also
* investigate any FSE involving a civil aircraft owned by the
Commonwealth, a State, or a Territory;4 ' or
* cooperate in the investigation of an FSE in which Australia
is neither the territorial nor national authority, for example
if evidence in relation to the event is found in Australia.4 2
However, neither agency may investigate an FSE that involves
a foreign military, police, or customs aircraft.4 3 CASA does not
have enforcement jurisdiction with respect to Australian Defence Force (ADF) aircraft,4 4 and the ATSB may only investigate
an event involving such aircraft if an "appropriate authority" in
the ADF has requested it to do so, unless the aircraft has been
registered under civil aviation law.4 In practice, FSEs involving
ADF aircraft will generally be investigated by the ADF's Directorate of Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety (DDAAFS). 4 6
There is, however, a memorandum of understanding between
the ATSB and DDAAFS that provides for mutual cooperation in
FSE investigations, particularly with respect to events involving
both civil and ADF aircraft.4 7 In some cases, such as a crash, a
37

TransportationSafety Investigation Act 2003 (Cth) s 12 (Austl.) [hereinafter TSI

Act].
Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) s B(1) (Austl.) [hereinafter Civil Aviation Act].
3 Civil Aviation Act, supra note 38, s 7; TSI Act, supra note 37, ss 21, 22.
40 Unless, in the case of CASA, responsibility for regulating that aircraft has
been passed to another contracting state pursuant to an agreement under Article
83 bis of the Chicago Convention.
41 See Section 3 of the TSI Act for the definition of "Australian aircraft." TSI
Act, supra note 37, s 3.
42 Id. at s 22(1) (c).
4 Id. s 3; Civil Aviation Act, supra note 38, s 3.
44 Civil Aviation Act, supra note 38, s 4.
45 TSIAct, supra note 37, ss 22(2), 22(3).
46 SeeAUSTRALIAN TRANsp. SAFETY BuRE-Au,
DEP'T OF DEF., HAZARDS AT AIRCRAFT
SIrEs: GUIDANCE FOR POLICE AND EMERGENCY PERSONNEL 5 (6th ed. Jan. 2014).
47 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Australian Transport Safety
Bureau and the Department of Defence Directorate of Defence Aviation and Air
Force Safety for Cooperation Relating to Transport Safety Investigation (Feb. 19,
38
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separate ADF inquiry will be appointed by a senior commander
to inquire into the matter under the Defence (Inquiry) Regulations of 1985.4

Both the ATSB and CASA may investigate an FSE involving a
state aircraft operated by the Australian Customs and Border
Protection Service or an Australian police service, in which respect they have broader jurisdiction than is envisaged under the
Chicago Convention. The Civil Aviation Act and the TSI Act explicitly require CASA and the ATSB to comply with Australia's
international obligations in the area of FSE investigation under
the Chicago Convention." Section 12AD of the TSI Act, inserted in 2009, provides that:
(1) The ATSB must ensure that the ATSB's powers under this
Act are exercised in a manner that is consistent with Australia's obligations under international agreements (as in
force from time to time) that are identified by the regulations for the purpose of this section.
(2) The Chief Commissioner must ensure that the Chief
Commissioner's powers under this Act are exercised in a
manner that is consistent with Australia's obligations
under international agreements (as in force from time to
time) that are identified by the regulations for the purpose of this section.
(3) In exercising powers under this Act, the ATSB and the
Chief Commissioner must also have regard to any rules,
recommendations, guidelines, codes, or other instruments (as in force from time to time) that are promulgated by an international organisation and that are
identified by the regulations for the purposes of this
section.o
Regulation 5.3 of the Transport Safety Investigation Regulations
of 2003 specifically identifies all of the international obligations
referred to above under the Chicago Convention as obligations
to which Section 12AD of the TSI Act applies.5 '
2014), available at http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/4075561/atsb%20ddaafs%20
mou%202013.pdf.
48 Id.
4
Civil Aviation Act, supra note 38, s 11; TSI Act, supra note 37, s 12AD.
5o Transport Safety Investigation Amendment Act 2009 (Cth), sch 1, pt 2 dir 1
(Austl.).
51 TSI Act, supra note 37, reg 5.3.
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This general commitment to the approach to FSE investigation mandated by Annex 13 is bolstered by a number of specific
provisions in the TSI Act. Section 12AA(3) of the Act, also inserted in 2009, provides that it is not the function of the ATSB:
* [T]o apportion blame for transport safety matters;
* to provide the means to determine the liability of any person in respect of a transport safety matter;
* to assist in court proceedings between parties (except as
provided by the TSI Act, whether expressly or impliedly);
* to allow any adverse inference to be drawn from the fact
that a person was involved in a transport safety matter.
There are however two important provisos to this section:
(1) the mere fact that a third party may draw an adverse inference, or infer blame or liability, from evidence collected by the ATSB "does not prevent the ATSB from
carrying out its functions," and
(2) the fact that blame attribution is not part of the ATSB's
function does not preclude a separate criminal or regulatory investigation from being conducted that may lead to
53
prosecution.
This reflects the separate role of CASA in conducting investigations with a view towards ensuring compliance through practices
including the application of administrative enforcement measures or prosecution."
In keeping with this separation of roles, Section 60 of the TSI
Act prevents evidence collected by the ATSB in an FSE investigation from being admitted in any subsequent criminal or civil
proceedings, unless:
* the criminal proceedings relate to an offense against the
TSI Act;5 5 or
* in the case of civil proceedings, the ATSB issues a certificate
that the disclosure of the information is not likely to interfere with any investigation, and the court makes an order
for disclosure on the grounds that it "is satisfied that any
adverse domestic and international impact that the disclosure of the information might have on any current or fu52
53

Id. s 12AA(3).
Id. ss 12AA(3)-(4).

54 See id.

55 Id. s 60(4)(b).
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ture investigations is outweighed by the public interest in
the administration of justice."5 6
In the military context, the protection afforded by Section 60
does not apply, but the separation is even more strict with respect to proceedings brought against a witness in an inquiry into
an FSE. Section 124(2C) of the Defence Act of 1903 provides
that:
A statement or disclosure made by a witness in the course of giving evidence before a court of inquiry, a board of inquiry, a Chief
of the Defence Force commission of inquiry, an inquiry officer or
an inquiry assistant is not admissible in evidence against that witness in:
(a) any civil or criminal proceedings in any federal court or
court of a State or Territory; or
(b) proceedings before a service tribunal;
otherwise than in proceedings by way of a prosecution for giving
false testimony at the hearing before the court of inquiry, the
board of inquiry, the Chief of the Defence Force commission of
inquiry, the inquiry officer or the inquiry assistant.5 7
In this respect, Australian law can be seen in most cases to apply
even stricter controls on the judicial use of FSE investigations
than is required by Standard 5.12 of Annex 13.5
Furthermore, reflecting the concern expressed in the ICAO
legal guidance about the use of CVR recordings in judicial proceedings, the Commonwealth Parliament has enacted legislation providing that, with very limited exceptions, CVR
recordings are not admissible in criminal or civil proceedings
against a member of the aircrew in an Australian court." These
rules of evidence also apply to courts martial and defence force
magistrates exercising jurisdiction over an alleged offense by
military aircrew under the Defence Force Discipline Act of
1982.6
The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that Australian law is at least consistent with the Annex 13 requirement to
56 Id. ss 60(4) (c),
(5)-(6); see, e.g., Elbe Shipping SA v Giant Marine Shipping SA
[2007] 159 FCR 518 (Austi.), in which the Federal Court considered the constitutional validity of Section 60(5).
57 Defence Act 1903 (Cth) s 124(2c) (Austl.).
58 See id.
59
Transportation Safety Investigation (ConsequentialAmendments) Act 2003 (Cth)
sch 1 (Austl.). Prior to 2003, the relevant law was located in the Air NavigationAct
1920 (Cth.) (Austl.).
-o Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) s 146 (Austl.).
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keep the evidence in respect of a safety investigation separate
from whatever evidence might be collected to support a prosecution. As indicated above, however, that is only part of a fully
developed Just Culture." The question is whether the Commonwealth authorities are prepared to rule out the prosecution of
offenses arising from FSEs that do not meet the Just Culture
threshold of reckless conduct, gross negligence, or willful
misconduct.
The Civil Aviation Regulations of 1988 contain a large number of strict liability offenses applicable to civil aviation. For example, subject to certain limited exceptions, the pilot of a fixedwing aircraft commits an offense if he or she flies the aircraft
over a town at an altitude lower than 1,000 feet above ground
level.62 In the case of military aviators, the Defence Force Discipline Act prescribes general offenses of negligent performance
of duty and negligent low flying." These are all offenses which
fall below the Just Culture threshold; they would not require
proof of any intent or even gross negligence.
The CASA enforcement policy makes it clear that the discretion to prosecute in cases involving civil aircraft is that of the
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP):
It is important for all officers to recognise the role that is played
by the CDPP in the criminal enforcement of all Commonwealth
laws, including the Act and the regulations. While CASA is responsible for investigating offences against the Act and the regulations, the function of prosecuting offences rests with the
CDPP.

...

While the Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth

(PPC) provides discretion as to what matters an agency investigates, the PPC requires that where an investigation discloses sufficient evidence of a serious offence, that the CDPP must be
consulted. Where CASA considers that the public interest does
not warrant prosecution or that some other action is appropriate,
the CDPP has advised that it must still be consulted in relation to
matters of real gravity. In deciding whether a prosecution should
be instituted or continued the CDPP will consider carefully any
views of CASA. However, the final decision on whether to prosecute or not rests with the CDPP.6 4
Depending on how one interprets "serious offence" and "matters of real gravity," it may be argued that the CASA enforceSee supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (Cth) reg 157 (Austl.).
63 Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) ss 35, 41 (Austl.).
61
62

64

CIL

AVIATION SAFETY AUTH., ENFORCEMENT

MANUAL 11-3 (2013).
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ment policy provides scope for the application ofJust Culture by
that agency. 65 CASA also has a range of alternative enforcement
options at its disposal-e.g., Aviation Infringement Notices, demerit points, suspension of license under CAR 265, or other administrative action.6 6 Based on an Australian working paper,
ICAO's Safety Information Protection Task Force has adopted
the view that such alternative enforcement options do not constitute "punishment" for the purposes of a Just Culture analysis,
if they are used exclusively for remedial or protective purposes.6 7 In contrast, neither the Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth,6" nor-in the case of military aviators-that of the
Director of Military Prosecutions, 6 9 make specific provision for
the adoption of Just Culture as a guiding principle in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion following an FSE.
IV. JUST CULTURE UNDER NEW ZEALAND LAW
It should come as no great surprise that the regulatory framework governing the investigation of FSEs in New Zealand is
quite similar to that in Australia. The Civil Aviation Act of 1990
(N.Z.) and Transport Accident Investigation Commission Act of
1990 (N.Z.) (TAIC Act) establish two separate agencies with authority to conduct parallel investigations following an FSE. The
Transport Accident Investigation Commission (TAIC) 7 o is New
Zealand's transport accident investigator, fulfilling the role described in Annex 13. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) 71 is,
inter alia, New Zealand's civil aviation enforcement authority.
65 See id.

See id. at vii-ix.
Some Caveats on 'Just Culture", supra note 6, at 4. The 38th Assembly of the
ICAO has instructed the Council to take steps to implement the Task Force's
recommendations in the SARPs. INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., RESOLUTIONS
ADOPTED BY THE ASSEMBLY 6 (Nov. 2013), available at http://www.icao.int/Meet
ings/a38/Documents/Resolutions/a38_res-prov-en.pdf.
66
67

OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, PROSECUTION POLICY OF THE
COMMONWEALTH 1 (Feb. 14, 2014), available at http://www.cdpp.gov.au/wp-con

tent/uploads/Prosecution-Policy-of-the-Commonwealth.pdf.
69 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF MILITARY PROSECUTIONS, DEP'T OF DEFENSE,
REPORT
1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 2012 (2013), available at http://www
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.defence.gov.au/publications/DMPAnnualReport_2012.pdf.
70 TAIC (pronounced "take" in New Zealand) was established
pursuant to Section 3 of the TAIC Act. Transportation Accident Investigation Commission Act
1990 s 3 (N.Z.).
71 The CAA of New Zealand was established pursuant
to Section 72A of the
Civil Aviation Act. Civil Aviation Act 1990 s 72A (N.Z.).
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The two agencies may investigate any FSE involving a civil aircraft72 in New Zealand or registered in New Zealand.7 3 TAIC
may also cooperate in the investigation of an FSE in which New
Zealand is neither the territorial nor national authority, for example if evidence in relation to the event is found in New
Zealand.74
By comparison with Australia, New Zealand's statutory law appears to provide broader scope for TAIC to conduct an investigation into an FSE involving a military aircraft. Section 13(3) of
the TAIC Act provides that TAIC's duty to investigate an accident or incident includes "the power to investigate any aviation
... accident or incident that involves any combination of military and non-military persons [or aircraft]."" This power must,

however, be read in the context of Section 2A(2) (a) of the TAIC
Act, which provides that nothing in that Act may be interpreted
as limiting the privileges and immunities of a foreign military
aircraft.7 6 At international law, a foreign military aircraft in New
Zealand enjoys sovereign immunity. 7 As a consequence, TAIC
could only lawfully exercise many of its investigative powers, including its powers of entry and seizure,7 with respect to a foreign military aircraft with the consent of that aircraft's sending
state.79 There is an interesting question in international law as to
whether sovereign immunity subsists with respect to foreign military aircraft wreckage, but that is beyond the scope of this
article.80
72 Civil Aviation Act 1990 s 4 (N.Z.); Transport Accident Investigation Commission Act 1990 s 13 (N.Z.). As a general rule, an FSE investigation by TAIC is
triggered by a mandatory notification from the CAA. Civil Aviation Act 1990 s 27
(N.Z.).
73 Unless, in the case of the CAA, responsibility for regulating that aircraft has
been passed to another contracting state pursuant to an agreement under Article
83 bis of the Chicago Convention. See Civil Aviation Act 1990 s 4(2) (N.Z.).
74 See Transport Accident Investigation Commission Act 1990 s 8(2) (e) (N.Z.).
75 "Military" is defined by Section 13(8) of the TAIC Act as relating to either
the New Zealand Defence Force or a visiting force. Id. s 13(8).
76 Id. s 2A(2).

77

SeeJAMES CRAwFoRD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

448 (8th ed. 2013); United Kingdom Materials on InternationalLaw 1985, 56 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 462-67 (1985) (discussing the diplomatic and legal proceedings
following the forced landing of a Royal Navy Sea Harrier on the cargo deck of the
Spanish-flagged merchant ship Alraigo in June 1983).
78 Transport Accident Investigation Commission Act 1990 s 12 (N.Z.).
79 See CRAWFORD, supra note 77, at 448.
80 See id.
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In practice, an FSE involving New Zealand Defence Force
(NZDF) aircraft will be investigated by the Royal New Zealand
Air Force (RNZAF) Directorate of Air Force Safety and Health
and, in most cases, will be the subject of a court of inquiry assembled under Section 200A of the Armed Forces Discipline Act
of 1971 (N.Z.). 81 This will be so whether there is a parallel TAIC
investigation or not, as Section 14(6) of the TAIC Act provides
that "[w] here an incident or accident ... is being investigated by
the Commission and the New Zealand Defence Force, or a visiting force, the Commission and the Chief of Defence Force shall
take all reasonable measures to ensure that the investigations
are co-ordinated." 8 2
In line with Australian military law, evidence adduced before
an NZDF court of inquiry is not admissible and may not be used
against any person in any other proceedings."' The inadmissibility applies to "any evidence in respect of the proceedings,"
which raises an interesting and as yet unresolved question as to
whether it applies to pre-existing documents, such as flight logs,
which are not created by the court of inquiry but nevertheless
received in evidence by that court. 4
The TAIC Act, in contrast, divides the information that may
be collected by TAIC in the course of an FSE investigation into
two discrete categories.85 The first category may be broadly understood as including all information that is created in the
course of the TAIC investigation.8 6 Information in this category
is not admissible in any proceeding against any person. The
second category consists of:
* a cockpit voice or video recording from a non-military
aircraft;
* a transcript of any such recording; or

See Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971 (N.Z.).
Transport Accident Investigation Commission Act 1990 s 14(6) (N.Z.).
83 Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971 s 2005 (N.Z.); see also R v Neave [1995]
NZCMAR 230 (CA). The exception in respect to proceedings for false statement
or perjury, which applies under Australian law, also applies under New Zealand
law. See supra text accompanying note 56.
84 Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971 s 2005 (N.Z.).
85 See Transport Accident Investigation Commission Act 1990 s 14B (N.Z.).
86 Id. s 14B(2).
81

82

87 Id. s 14B(1) (b).
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* any document containing personal information obtained by
TAIC during an investigation which was not created in the
course of that investigation."
Information in the second category "is not admissible against a
member of the flight crew of a military or a non-military aircraft
in any proceedings."" Such information may, however, be obtained and produced under an order for discovery in civil proceedings before the High Court of New Zealand, subject to the
application of strict criteria. 90
Again, the conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that
New Zealand law is consistent with the Annex 13 requirement to
keep the evidence with respect to a safety investigation separate
from whatever evidence might be collected to support a prosecution. As indicated above, however, that is only part of a fully
developed Just Culture. The question is whether the New Zealand authorities are prepared to rule out the prosecution of offenses arising from FSEs that do not meet the Just Culture
threshold of reckless conduct, gross negligence, or willful
misconduct.
Under Section 43A of the Civil Aviation Act, the pilot of a civil
aircraft commits an offense if he or she operates the aircraft in a
careless manner. 9 ' In the case of military aviators, the Armed
Forces Discipline Act prescribes similar offenses of negligent
performance of duty and negligently hazarding an aircraft.
These are all offenses of negligence simpliciter-i.e., they would
not require proof of gross negligence."
In the civil aviation context, the prosecution policy of the
CAA is set out in its Regulatory Enforcement Policy, released on
November 21, 2013.94 It does not explicitly mandate the application of Just Culture in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
but there are some indications in that direction. For example, in
paragraph 5.4 the policy states: "The CAA prefers not to take
enforcement action against those who fully report details of accidents and incidents pursuant to Civil Aviation Rule Part 12.
88

Id. s 14C(2).

89 Id. s 14D(2).
90 Id. ss 14E-14J.

91 Civil Aviation Act 1990 s 43A (N.Z.).
Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971 ss 73(1)(d), 64(2) (N.Z.).
See, e.g., Civil Aviation Authority v Gunn (unreported) District Court, Queenstown, CRI-2011-059-000314, 7March 2013, Phillips J, at paras. 7, 6 (N.Z.).
94 CIVIL AVIATION AUTH. OF N.Z., REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT POLIcY 2 (Nov.
21, 2013)
92
93
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However, enforcement action is more likely to result when reporting is patently incomplete or reveals reckless or repetitive atrisk behaviours."9 5 In paragraph 5.5, the policy further states:
Consistent with the public interest test in the Solicitor-General's
Prosecution Guidelines, the CAA applies proportionality and
consistency principles to take into account the aviation safety regulatory environment. This ensures that enforcement actions are
proportionate to the risks and the potential for harm posed in
any given situation. It also provides clarity to aviation participants
as to how the Regulatory Enforcement Policy will be applied."
In contrast, there is little scope for the application ofJust Culture in New Zealand's military aviation context. This is because
Section 102(1) of the Armed Forces Discipline Act provides that
an accused aviator's commanding officer must initiate a prosecution "unless he or she considers that the allegation is not well
founded."97 In New Zealand's Manual of Armed Forces Law,
"well founded" is defined exclusively in terms of evidential sufficiency." The implication of this is that the commanding officers
of RNZAF squadrons do not have a prosecutorial discretionthey have a prosecutorial duty." Given that their Australian
counterparts do have prosecutorial discretion, it may be time for
the New Zealand Parliament (or the courts) to revisit this, although such a re-examination would need to be conducted in a
broader military justice context than solely that of military FSEs.
V. JUST CULTURE AND THE PHILOSOPHY
OF CRIMINAL LAW
To make sense of the arguments for and against Just Culture
in the aviation and legal communities, it is necessary to put the
administration of criminal justice into its proper philosophical
context:
When trying to make sense of an institution that causes as much
hardship as our system of criminal justice, it is perfectly natural
to ask what good we mean to bring about through all this suffering. Indeed, this question has been the central focus of both ma5 Id. at 4.
96

Id.

97 Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971 s 102(1) (N.Z.).
98 N.Z. DEF. FORCE, MANUAL OF ARMED FORCES LAw: COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK

§ 2, para. 4.2.2 (Mar. 31, 2014), available at http://1gdata.s3website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/docs/905/483579/New Zealand LOACMan
ual.pdf.
9 See id.
ON MILiTARY LAw,
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jor schools in punishment theory for centuries. Utilitarians
suggest that this hardship is ultimately worthwhile because it prevents more harm than it causes (through deterrence, rehabilitation, etc). Most retributivists suggest that punishing the guilty is
itself an important goal to be pursued."oo
The principal philosophical argument in favor ofJust Culture
in an aviation context is precisely that, from a utilitarian standpoint, the prosecution of aircrew following an FSE does not promote aviation safety and in fact is inimical to it:
Whilst the argument is sometimes mounted that the sanction of
criminal or civil prosecution will encourage increased compliance by aviation professionals, thereby enhancing aviation safety,
this is, at best, questionable. In fact, such an argument is a manifestation of what has been described as "the fallacy of the perfectibility approach." The threat of prosecution cannot prevent
human error. Moreover, it would seem that the threat of almost
certain death, for the aviators and their passengers should they
fail, would be far greater encouragement to compliance.' 0 '
In the maritime context, similar sentiments were expressed
following the recent unsuccessful prosecution of the master of
the New Zealand inter-island ferry MV Santa Regina.1 0 2 It may be
that Just Culture is a utilitarian concept with relevance beyond
the aviation community.
In the aviation context, the validity of the Just Culture argument from this utilitarian perspective may derive some support
from the analysis of statistics provided in the most recent annual
reports of CASA and the ATSB 1 s in Australia and the CAA in
New Zealand. The 2012-2013 Annual Report of the ATSB contains data for the total number of reported FSEs in Australia
during the years 2008 to 2012.104 In 2008 and 2009, the total
100 Malcolm Thorburn, CriminalLaw as Public Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDA21-22 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011).
1o, Samantha Sharif, The Failure of Aviation Safety in New Zealand: An Examination of New Zealand's Implementation of Its InternationalObligations Under Annex 13 of
the Chicago Convention on InternationalCivil Aviation, 68 J. AIR L. & COM. 339, 346
(2003).
102 Kenneth D. Watt, Letter: Ferry Captain was Wrongly Prosecuted,DOMINION POST
(Mar. 20, 2014), www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/comment/letters-to-the-editor/
9847395.
1os The ATSB is the Commonwealth's official record keeper of all reported
FSEs. AUSTRALIAN TRANSP. SAFETY BUREAU, DEP'T OF DEF., ATSB ANNUAL REPORT
2012-13, 56 (2013), available at http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/4355822/ATSB
AnnualReport2012-13.pdf.
104 Id.

TIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

460

[79

number was around 8000.105 In 2010, it spiked to just over 8,500
and has remained steady at around that level since.10 6 This represents an approximate 6.25% increase in FSEs over the period. 1o7 During this same period, CASA's Annual Report
indicates a substantial increase in the number of cases referred
for prosecution around 2010, with a return to the previous level
of ten to fifteen per annum in the following years. 0 s At the
same time, the number of infringement notices issued by CASA
has increased by about one quarter. 109
The CAA's Annual Report for 2012-2013 indicates that between 2008 and 2012, the total number of reported FSEs in New
Zealand remained relatively steady at around 6,000, with a sharp
drop to 5,500 and fewer in 2009 and 2010.11o The number of
prosecutions initiated per year hovers at around twenty."' At
the same time, the number of infringement notices has dwindled from ten in 2008 to four in 2012.'12 What is most interesting is that the year after the most number of prosecutions in the
period were initiated,1 1 3 the total number of FSEs actually increased by almost 10%."1
The best that can be said of the statistics is that there is no
demonstrable correlation between prosecutions initiated as a
consequence of FSEs and a reduction in the number of FSEs
occurring subsequently. There are many variables which impact
the usefulness of the statistics in this regard; patently, they cannot be regarded as either proving the case for Just Culture or,
indeed, the contrary argument. However, one view of the data
may suggest that Sharif is correct in her assertion that prosecution does not deliver an appreciable and apparent deterrent effect in the aviation community. 1 5
lo Id. at 56-58.

.

106 Id.
107 See id.
108 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 2012-13, APPENDICES AND
REFERENCES 179 (2013), available at http://www.casa.gov.au/wcmswr/_assets/

main/1ib100228/arl213_p6.pdf.
109 See id.
110 CIVIL AVIATION AUTH. OF N.Z., ANNUAL REPORT 2012-2013, 96 (2013), avail-

able at http://www.caa.govt.nz/about-caa/AnnualReports/CAAAnnualRe
port_2013.pdf.
III Id.
112 Id.
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Does this mean that the prosecution of aviators following an
FSE is inevitably a pointless exercise? The eminent legal philosopher, Professor Antony Duff, suggests not." 6 "We should
criminalise certain wrongs in order to mark them out as public
wrongs, which must be condemned as such, and for which their
perpetrators should be called to answer; but that is not to say
that we have good reason to criminalise every kind of
wrongdoing."'
Accepting that this is a retributivist rather than utilitarian approach, Duff goes on to suggest that society should "criminalise
only wrongs that cause or threaten harm to others.""'s There is a
certain resonance here with the Just Culture ethos that punishment be reserved for "gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts.""10
VI.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article has been to examine the extent to
which the notion of Just Culture is or might be accommodated
within the frameworks of law that apply to both civil and military
aviation in Australia and New Zealand. In that respect, it identifies two streams of Just Culture. The first stream requires appropriate evidential separation between FSE investigations and
enforcement investigations. The second represents an aspiration that prosecutorial discretion be exercised sparingly in aviation cases. There is little doubt that international aviation law
already places significant impetus behind the first stream. This is
reflected in Australian and New Zealand law to a very large
degree.
The second stream ofJust Culture is more problematic as current law and policy stands. As has been indicated, it cannot be
applied in the case of New Zealand military aviators without an
amendment to the Armed Forces Discipline Act.12 0 For the remainder of the Australian and New Zealand aviation community, the matter turns on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
by the relevant enforcement authority.1 2 1 There are already policy indications, particularly from the CAA in New Zealand, that
116
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an approach akin to Just Culture may now be viewed with favor
in at least some official quarters.12 2 On the other hand, both
countries still have a number of minor aviation offenses in their
statute books which would not be required in that form if their
Parliaments were committed to the application of Just Culture.12 1 It may be that the evolution of not prosecuting for certain
offenses is more palatable at this point than the revolution of repeal. There are parallels here with some other areas of the criminal law that have gradually faded from use.1 2 1 Perhaps the time
has come for a parliamentary re-examination of the use of infringement offenses for minor aviation offenses as an alternative
to prosecution on both sides of the Tasman Sea.
There is doubtless greater scope for the application of Just
Culture in both Australia and New Zealand. The commentary
from the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation and our own Antipodean aviation safety data suggests that
this represents an opportunity for something of a paradigm
shift, in which Australia and New Zealand could assume a leadership role.1 2 5 It remains to be seen whether that opportunity
will be taken up.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.

123 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 61-62, 90-92.
124 See, e.g., Simon France & John Pike, Criminal Law, pt. V, para. 217, in THE
LAWS OF NEw ZEALAND (Hon. Justice SirJohn McGrath ed., 2013) ("The offense
of blasphemy remains in the Crimes Act 1961 without, it must be thought, any
particular room for application.").
125 See discussion supra Part I.

